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WHY GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT IS
REQUIRED IN REDEFINING THE PARTICULAR SOCIAL
GROUP DEFINITION IN REFUGEE LAW
Liliya Paraketsova*
ABSTRACT
One of the most debated topics in refugee law has been the meaning of particu-
lar social group (PSG)—one of the five categories used to claim refugee status. In
2006, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted a narrower PSG defini-
tion. Since that adoption, a circuit split has persisted over the meaning of PSG.
Two circuits in particular have continually refused to adopt this definition—even
when the BIA attempted to revise the definition in response to their criticism. This
Note proposes a reform that would include a compromise between the two current
definitions of PSG by rejecting the BIA’s particularity requirement and transform-
ing the social distinction requirement into a flexible standard. Further, this Note
advises that the Supreme Court provide guidance to the BIA to ensure that all
jurisdictions adhere to the new definition.
INTRODUCTION
The particular social group (PSG) definition has been the sub-
ject of more litigation and academic debate than the other portions
of the legal definition of a refugee. Since the term is not used in
ordinary language and is not defined in the international Refugee
Convention, it has understandably led to contention. The defini-
tion of PSG is important because how narrowly or broadly PSG is
defined can result in vast differences in who is granted asylum. It is
essential, therefore, for the United States to provide consistency
across jurisdictions by establishing a single definition of PSG. Ensur-
ing consistency means that all applicants will be treated fairly
regardless of where they apply for asylum. However, ever since the
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Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted a narrowed PSG defi-
nition, consistency across jurisdictions has not been feasible. This is
because two federal circuits have continually refused to adopt the
BIA’s narrowed definition. Therefore, what amounts to a PSG—
and therefore who receives asylum—depends on the circuit. This
Note proposes a reform that would include a compromise between
the two current definitions and also call for the Supreme Court to
provide guidance to the BIA to ensure that the new definition
would be adhered to, thereby eliminating any inconsistencies
amongst the circuits.
Part I discusses the definition of a refugee and provides a general
overview of refugee law’s history and how it fits into the broader
immigration law system, as well as the practical implementations of
refugee law. Part II provides a detailed analysis of how the BIA has
attempted to revise the PSG definition in the last ten years and the
federal appellate courts’ responses to those attempts. Finally, Part
III calls for the Supreme Court to provide detailed guidance for the
BIA to revise the PSG definition to one that removes the particular-
ity requirement and changes the social distinction requirement into
a flexible standard.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Immigration Law in the United States
Immigration law, as we know it today, did not exist at the forma-
tion of the United States. Individual states had their own
naturalization requirements until the federal government passed
the 1790 Naturalization Act.1 While immigrants always had to meet
certain requirements to become citizens, entrance into and pres-
ence in the United States was relatively uninhibited.2 People from
any country could move to the United States whenever they wanted
to, so long as they could afford it, without obtaining permission
from the federal or state governments.3 The first significant federal
1. See Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795) (establishing “a uniform
Rule of Naturalization”). For a discussion of naturalization law in the American colonies, see
generally Edward E. Hoyt, Naturalization Under the American Colonies: Signs of a New Community,
67 POL. SCI. Q. 248 (1952).
2. See, e.g., Robbie Totten, National Security and U.S. Immigration Policy, 1776–1790, 39 J.
INTERDISC. HIST 37, 38 (2008) (“During the ‘Open Door Era’ from the early republic to
approximately the twentieth century, the borders of the United States were legally unregu-
lated by the federal government, except for a few minor restrictions . . . .”); see also Henry B.
Hazard, The Immigration and Nationality Systems of the United States of America, 14 F.R.D. 105, 107
(1954).
3. See Hazard, supra note 2 at 106.
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legislation dealing with immigration matters other than naturaliza-
tion was passed in 1819.4 Then, in 1864, Congress established a
Commissioner of Immigration and the United States Emigrant Of-
fice.5 The Emigrant Office was responsible for helping immigrants
travel within the United States and protecting them from fraud.6
The Commissioner oversaw immigrant employment contracts be-
cause the Act required immigrants to pledge a portion of their
wages to the United States to repay “the expenses of their
emigration.”7
Two Acts in 1875 and 1882 added regulations regarding who
could be admitted and who would be excluded.8 Subsequent acts
mainly expanded exclusion categories.9 The Emergency Quota Act
of 1921 established yearly quotas on immigration.10 Much of the
later legislation was enacted as a response to the public’s resistance
to immigration and as a solution to limit the flow of immigration,
both quantitatively and qualitatively.11 The Emergency Quota Act of
1921 also created a number of classes that were exempt from the
maximum quota, allowing any number of immigrants from those
classes into the United States.12
B. Refugee Law as a Response to Immigration Law
The development of immigration law also resulted in the de-
mand for and creation of more specific categories of immigrant
4. See An Act Regulating Passenger Ships and Vessels, ch. 46, 3 Stat. 488 (1819) (requir-
ing the captain or master of a ship to deliver a list or manifest of the passengers to a federal
collector). See also FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, History of U.S. Immigration
Laws (2018), https://fairus.org/legislation/reports-and-analysis/history-of-us-immigration-
laws.
5. An Act to Encourage Immigration, ch. 246, § 1, 13 Stat. 385, 386 (1864).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, § 1, 22 Stat. 214, 214 (imposing a fifty-cent duty
on every immigrant entering the country and prohibited convicts, lunatics and idiots from
landing); Page Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (repealed 1974) (prohibiting importation of
women for prostitution and forced servitude contracts of Chinese or Japanese nationals).
9. See generally Hazard, supra note 2, at 109–10.
10. See Emergency Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5 (1921) (yearly
admissions were limited by nationality to three percent of foreign born people of the same
nationality that had resided in the United States at the time of the 1910 census).
11. See, e.g., The Rush of Immigrants, USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/us/
38c.asp (last visited June 11, 2017) (“Not all Americans welcomed the new immigrants with
open arms. While factory owners greeted the rush of cheap labor with zeal, laborers often
treated their new competition with hostility. Many religious leaders were awestruck at the
increase of non-Protestant believers. [Racial purists] feared the genetic outcome of the even-
tual pooling of these new bloods.”).
12. Emergency Quota Act of 1921.
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status, including categories for employment status, family-based sta-
tus, and refugee status, with different requirements and procedures
for each. Refugee law, in part a response to immigration law itself,
was created as a form of relief for people that needed to flee their
countries. It was presented as a solution to people in dire situations
that did not have the luxury of time and planning—it was not origi-
nally meant to be a part of the traditional immigration law
regime.13 Refugees were not subject to the same numerical limita-
tions as other types of immigrants,14 and many of the qualitative
requirements could be waived for refugees.15
The need for creating a process for allowing the immigration of
refugees was also felt internationally. As a response, the Refugee
Convention of 1951 (Convention), a revision of previous interna-
tional agreements, was created.16 The Convention was inspired by
humanitarian concerns for the large number of refugees after the
two World Wars,17 but it was only necessary because of the immigra-
tion law requirements that existed. States agreed to be bound by
the Convention,18 and later, the Refugee Protocol of 1967 (Proto-
col),19 because they recognized that they needed a solution
separate from immigration for people fleeing from persecution.20
13. See James C. Hathaway, Why Refugee Law Still Matters, 8 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 89, 96
(2007) (“Refugee law is therefore fundamentally a mechanism of human rights protection,
not a mode of immigration.”).
14. For example, The Refugee Act of 1980 set the maximum refugee quotas to 50,000
per year for the first three years, allowed the President to change that number based on
humanitarian concerns, and set it for subsequent years. Pub L. No. 96-212, § 207(a)(1) 94
Stat. 102 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1) (2012)). Asylees (people who are
already present in the United States) are not subject to this quota. See Refugee Act of 1980
§ 208(a) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012)) (containing no provision for set-
ting a maximum quota for an asylee).
15. Most importantly, people that seek asylum are not required to have legal status to
apply for asylum; physical presence is sufficient. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012).
16. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees pmbl., opened for Signature July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 150 (hereinafter Convention) (“Considering that it is desirable to
revise and consolidate previous international agreements relating to the status of refugees
and to extend the scope of and protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new
agreement.”).
17. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), THE 1951 CONVENTION
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 1 (2011), http://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/4ec262df9/1951-convention-relating-status-ref-
ugees-its-1967-protocol.html. See also The 1951 Refugee Convention – Q&A, UNHCR (2017),
http://unhcr.org.ua/en/component/content/article/8-stati-na-anglijskom/63-the-1951-ref-
ugee-convention-q-a-a (“[the Convention] was limited to protecting mainly European
refugees in the aftermath of World War II”).
18. Id.
19. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (hereinafter Protocol).
20. Convention, supra note 16, at pmbl., 189 U.N.T.S. at 152 (discussing “the social and
humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees”).
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The Convention and the Protocol prompted states to remove immi-
gration formalities for a certain subset of migrants that were being
denied protection in their own countries—a subset that was limited
enough to not overwhelm the world’s resources. As defined by the
Convention, a refugee is a person who:
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nation-
ality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habit-
ual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to return to it.21
Initially, the Convention only applied to refugees that were de-
fined as refugees under previous arrangements,22 or became
refugees due to events occurring prior to January 1, 1951,23 with
“events” meaning “events occurring in Europe.”24
In the years following the creation of the Convention, people
fled from persecution that stemmed from events that happened af-
ter 1951, or from countries outside of Europe.25 In 1967, the
Protocol removed the geographical and temporal requirements
from the definition, expanding it to include refugees that were flee-
ing persecution from outside of Europe and after the events of
January 1, 1951.26 The refugee definition cannot be changed by any
of the parties that sign the Convention or Protocol.27
C. History of Refugee Law in the United States
The United States was an active member during the drafting of
the Convention. Mr. George Lewis Warren represented the United
21. Id. art. 1A(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.
22. Id. art. 1A(1), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.
23. Id. art. 1A(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152.
24. Id. art. 1B(1)(a), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154. The Refugee Convention also allowed states to
expand the geographical requirement beyond Europe by declaration at the time of signing
the convention. Id. art. 1B(1)(b), 189 U.N.T.S. at 154.
25. See Protocol, supra note 19, at pmbl., 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268. (“Con-
sidering that new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention was adopted and that
the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of the Convention . . . .”).
26. Id. art. 1(2)–(3), 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268–70.
27. Id. art. 42(1), 189 U.N.T.S. at 182 (“At the time of signature, ratification or acces-
sion, any State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to Articles 1, 3,
4, 16(1), 33, 36-46 inclusive.”).
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States at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries and made significant
contributions.28 However, the United States never ratified the Con-
vention.29 Perhaps part of the reason the United States did not sign
the Convention was because it wanted to retain control over grant-
ing refugee status to the most deserving and sympathetic
candidates—women and children, as well as those who had already
suffered from persecution. Another reason is that ratifying treaties
is difficult in the United States, as the Constitution requires the
President to obtain advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate
before he can ratify a treaty.30
However, the United States adopted a number of national mea-
sures that provided some relief for refugees.31 One such measure,
the Refugee and Migration Act of 1962, enabled the United States
to provide assistance to “certain migrants and refugees.”32 It author-
ized the President to continue the United States’ membership in
the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and al-
lowed appropriations for contributions to activities of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and for ser-
vices to and resettlement of refugees.33 It also defined the term
refugee as:
[An] alien[ ] who (A) because of persecution or fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, political opinion, fled
from a nation or area of the Western Hemisphere; (B) cannot
return thereto because of fear of persecution on account of
race, religion or political opinion; and (C) [is] in urgent need
of assistance for the essentials of life[.]34
28. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Per-
sons, Summary Record of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.24 (Nov. 27,
1951).
29. UNHCR, STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REF-
UGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL 1 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/
3b73b0d63/states-parties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html (hereinafter STATES
PARTIES).
30. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
31. These included the Presidential Directive on Displaced Persons signed on Decem-
ber 22, 1945 by President Truman, the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, and the Refugee Relief
Act of 1953. See USCIS, Refugee Timeline (last updated June 27, 2017), https://www.uscis.gov/
history-and-genealogy/our-history/refugee-timeline.
32. Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat. 121 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1104, 1182 note (Resettlement of Refugee-Escapee); 22
U.S.C. §§ 2601 to 2606 (2012)).
33. Id. at 121–22.
34. Id. at 122.
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This definition was somewhat similar to the definition provided
by the Convention. For example, it included the same geographical
requirement. But it also included several differences: (1) it allowed
past persecution in addition to fear of future persecution; (2) it
changed “being persecuted” to “persecution”; (3) it changed “for
reasons of” to “on account of”; (4) it omitted “nationality” and “par-
ticular social group”; and (5) it added the requirement that the
alien be “in urgent need of assistance.” The fifth requirement al-
lowed the United States to prioritize refugee status to those most in
need and to retain control. As the United States was not a party to
the Convention at the time of enactment of the Migration and Ref-
ugee Assistance Act of 1962, it was free to create its own definition
and was not internationally obligated to provide assistance to refu-
gees in the same way that the Convention parties were.
In 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was cre-
ated. The 1965 Act differentiated from the 1962 Act by revising the
previous numerical limits on nationalities,35 creating numerical lim-
its for the Western and Eastern hemispheres of 120,000 and
170,000 respectively.36 It also placed a numerical limit of 20,000 per
country, prioritized people with special employment skills or famil-
ial relationships, and exempted immediate relatives of citizens from
the numerical limitations.37
On November 1, 1968, the United States ratified the Refugee
Protocol.38 Congress then codified the treaty obligations of the Pro-
tocol in the Refugee Act of 1980, which amended the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1965 and Migration and Refugee Assistance
Act of 1962.39 Following this, the Refugee Act of 1980 changed the
definition of a refugee to:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s na-
tionality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually re-
sided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
35. The limits for nationalities were set at two percent of the foreign-born nationals in
the United States of the same nationality, but no less than 100 people. Immigration Act of
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153, 159 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.). The total annual limit for immigrants was 150,000, but there were a number of
classes that were exempt from the numerical limitation, like immediate family members of
citizens and people in particular career fields. Id. at 155, 159.
36. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 911, 916,
921 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
37. Id. at §§ 201–202, 79 Stat. 911–13.
38. STATES PARTIES, supra note 29, at 4.
39. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified and amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protec-
tion of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion40
This definition is much closer to the Protocol definition, as it
removed the geographical restriction as well as the requirement
that the person be in urgent need of assistance, and it added “na-
tionality” and “particular social group” to the grounds for
persecution that had been previously omitted. People who met the
refugee definition would be granted refugee status at the discretion
of the Attorney General.41 In addition to refugee status, the United
States grants asylum status to people who meet the refugee defini-
tion but are inside the United States.42
D. Current Practices of Granting Refugee and Asylum Status
The majority of the world’s countries have signed both the Proto-
col and the Convention,43 so the refugee definitions in those
countries apply to people that become refugees at any period in
time, and in any country in the world. Such people are thus recog-
nized as refugees in states that are parties to the Protocol.44 The
United States is one of the few countries that signed the Protocol
but not the Convention.45 However, as the Protocol incorporates
the vast majority of the Convention by reference,46 the United
40. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42) (2012).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012).
42. Refugees and Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/
humanitarian/refugees-asylum (last updated Nov. 12, 2015).
43. See STATES PARTIES, supra note 29, at 1. 145 states have signed the Convention, and
146 have signed the Protocol. Id. Only Madagascar, St. Kits and Nevis have signed the Con-
vention and not the Protocol. Id.
44. The UNHCR describes when recognition of refugee status occurs:
A person is a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 Convention as soon as he fulfils
the criteria contained in the definition. This would necessarily occur prior to the time
at which his refugee status is formally determined. Recognition of his refugee status
does not therefore make him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not
become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.
UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Con-
vention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 28, UN Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/
REV.3 (1979, reedited 2011) (hereinafter Handbook).
45. STATES PARTIES, supra note 29, at 1 (United States is joined by Cabo Verde and Vene-
zuela as signatories only to the Refugee Convention).
46. Protocol, supra note 19, art. 1(1), 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268 (“The States
Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply Articles 2 to 34 inclusive of the Conven-
tion to refugees as hereinafter defined.”). The Protocol defines Refugees the same way as the
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States recognizes people who meet the refugee definition of the
Convention, but calls them asylees if they are within the United
States when they apply for asylum. In contrast, the United States
calls migrants who meet the international refugee definition but
are outside of the United States, refugees.
The United States has a numerical limitation for refugees, as de-
fined by the Refugee Act of 1980, which is determined each year by
the President.47 The code section prescribing procedures for asylees
does not provide a numerical limitation on the asylum applications
that can be granted per year.48 However, not all asylees who apply
and meet the definition will be granted asylum in the same year
they apply.49
There are two different types of asylum applications depending
on the current status of the immigration seeker.50 A person who is
not in removal proceedings files an affirmative asylum applica-
tion.51 A person who is in removal proceedings files a defensive
asylum application.52 Different agencies process the two types of
claims.53
The Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations (RAIO) of
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Board (USCIS),
which is part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),54
processes the affirmative applications.55 In October 2017, RAIO ad-
judicated affirmative applications from people who filed their
applications between June 2013 and February 2016, depending on
which region of the U.S. they lived in.56 This means people were
waiting anywhere from two to five years after filing their asylum
claim before they were granted asylum if they met the definition.57
Convention, only removing the words “As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951”
and “as a result of such events” from the Convention definition. Id. art. 1(2), 19 U.S.T. at
6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012).
49. See Affirmative Asylum Scheduling Bulletin, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-scheduling-bulle-
tin (last updated Nov. 6, 2017).
50. Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (last
updated Oct. 19, 2015) (hereinafter Obtaining Asylum).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. DHS, ORGANIZATIONAL CHART 23 (2017), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/Public%20Org%20Charts%202017.08.15.pdf.
55. Obtaining Asylum, supra note 50.
56. Affirmative Asylum Scheduling Bulletin, supra note 49.
57. Id. These processing times do not include children or people whose interviews have
been rescheduled because their applications are prioritized. Id.
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Arguably, these processing times create an unofficial numerical lim-
itation, though it changes yearly.
Those claiming asylum after they are already in removal proceed-
ings file defensive applications.58 Immigration Judges preside over
these proceedings, and the Immigration Judges are part of the Ex-
ecutive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).59 The EOIR is
housed under the Department of Justice (DOJ), in a completely
separate agency from the DHS.60 Processing times for defensive
claims of asylum are supposed to be less than 180 days.61 However,
only an average of thirty-five percent of defensive asylum claims re-
ceived per year were processed between 2012 and 2016.62 The
number of claims received did not change significantly from 2011
to 2015, though there was a larger increase in 2016.63 Further, ac-
cording to the American Immigration Council, the Immigration
Courts and RAIO had a combined backlog of more than 620,000
cases in 2016.64 That backlog means that both defensive and offen-
sive asylum claims are taking significantly longer to process, and,
according to the American Immigration Council, the actual average
wait time for defensive claims in Immigration Court for asylum
seekers is more than three years.65
Overall, the EOIR and the USCIS together have granted asylum
to an average of 22,573 people per year from 1990 to 2014.66 The
smallest number of asylum grants was 5,035 in 1991 and the largest
number was 39,148 in 2001.67 In general, there was an upward
trend of asylum claims granted from 1990 through 2001, and a
58. Defensive claims are processed by the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(EOIR), which is a part of the Department of Justice, while offensive claims are processed by
the USCIS, which is a part of the Department of Homeland Security. Obtaining Asylum, supra
note 50.
59. See DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, https://www.justice.gov/eoir (last vis-
ited Nov. 19, 2017).
60. See id.
61. DOJ, UNIFORM DOCKETING SYSTEMS MANUAL Intro-8 (rev. 2013), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/04/07/DocketManual_12_2013.pdf.
62. To determine the average claims processed, this Note included claims that were
denied or granted as processed in; claims that were abandoned, withdrawn, or other were
not included. DOJ, ASYLUM STATISTICS: FY2012-FY2016 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/
file/asylum-statistics/download.
63. Id. (the average number of asylum claims received between 2012 and 2016 was
53,375, with the largest number of claims being 65,218 in 2016 and smallest number being
47,534 in 2011).
64. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2016), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/asylum_in_the_united
_states.pdf.
65. Id. Affirmative applications currently take at least two years. Id.
66. DHS, 2014 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 43, tbl.16 (2016), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS%202014%20Yearbook.pdf.
67. Id.
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downward trend from 2001 through 2014, with no years reaching
30,000 granted asylum claims since 2002.68 Between 1990 and 2014,
the affirmative applications have accounted for an average of sixty-
four percent of claims granted, although in 2006 and 2007 defen-
sive applications accounted for the majority of claims: granted at
fifty-one percent.69 There may be many reasons for this trend in
asylum applications granted, which peaked in 2001, including tight-
ened security screening after 9/11 or possibly smaller
appropriations in subsequent years.70
E. What Particular Social Group Means in the Refugee Definition
Both people who receive asylum status and those who receive ref-
ugee status must, at a minimum, meet the refugee definition, as
codified by Congress in 1980.71 One area of the definition that has
resulted in significant litigation at both the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) and federal appellate level is the definition of “par-
ticular social group.” To be a refugee or asylee, a person must have
been persecuted or have a fear of being persecuted “on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.”72 The Convention itself does not provide a
definition for those five grounds.73 However, defining the first three
grounds—race, religion, and nationality—has been a fairly straight-
forward process for courts overall.74 Defining what political opinion
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. However, in the 2008 fiscal year, appropriations to USCIS amounted for only $81
million or 3.38% of total revenue, while fee revenue amounted for $2.5 billion or 96.15% of
total revenue, so it seems unlikely that USCIS is very dependent on appropriations for staff-
ing. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008 27
(2008) https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports/uscis-annual-
report-2008.pdf.
71. The definition of a refugee is codified at 8 U.S.C. section 1101(a)(42) (2012). The
determination of an asylee is outlined in 8 U.S.C. section 1158(b)(1)(a) (2012), which refers
back to the refugee definition at section 1101(a)(42) (2012). Asylum seekers just need to
meet the definition and apply for status within one year of entering the U.S., 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012), while refugee seekers must meet the definition and also comply
with additional requirements, including security clearance and vulnerability assessments, im-
posed by the U.S. Refugee Admissions Programs. U.S. Refugee Admissions Program FAQs, U.S.
DEP’T ST. (Jan. 20, 2017) https://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2017/
266447.htm.
72. 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42) (2012).
73. Convention, supra note 16.
74. JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 395–96 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 2014) (1991) (advocating for a broad interpretation approach that
“has been accepted without controversy in a wide range of state parties to the Convention:”).
Nationality, which at times overlaps with race, has also been given a broad meaning. Id. at 398
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consists of has resulted in a greater variance of definitions across
jurisdictions.75 However, most of the definitions of political opinion
seem to define it broadly as having any opinion relating to the gov-
ernment or society.76
Defining particular social group (PSG) has been much more dif-
ficult. In common language, particular social group has no plain
meaning, as people typically do not use those three words together.
There is almost no drafting history in the Convention that signifies
what the term meant to the drafters.77 To interpret it too broadly
would make the other grounds superfluous and go against the in-
tention of the framers which was to have a definition that would
create concrete obligations for the States that are parties to the
Convention.78 To interpret it too narrowly could also be contrary to
the intention of the framers, because the narrower definition could
result in a rejection of claims of people that are deserving of protec-
tion by the refugee definition.
(“their claims to refugee protection may reasonably be determined on the basis of nationality
as well as race”); see also Calado v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] 89
FCR 59, 67 (Federal Court) (Austl.). The United Nations Human Rights Committee’s broad
interpretation of religion in the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights’ right to
freedom of religion has also been adopted by many state parties for the purpose of the Refu-
gee Convention. Compare U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comments Adopted by the
Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, cmt. 22(48), ¶ 2, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Sept. 27,
1993) (interpreting freedom of religion to include “theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs,
as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief”) with Council Directive 2011/95, art.
10(1)(b), 2011 OJ (L 337/16) (hereinafter EU Directive) (“[T]he concept of religion shall
in particular include the holding of theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs.”).
75. Compare GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1st ed.
1983) (defining “political opinion” as “any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of
state, government and policy may be engaged”) and Canada v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689,
746 (Can.) (adopting Goodwin-Gill and McAdam’s definition) with EU Directive, supra note
74, art. 10(1)(e) (defining political opinion to “include the holding of an opinion, thought
or belief on a matter related to the potential actors of persecution . . . and to their policies or
methods”) and UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under
Article 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status for Refugees,
¶ 45, UN Doc. HCR/GIP/09/08 (Dec. 22, 2009) (defining political opinion as one “not
tolerated by the authorities or society and that are critical of generally accepted policies,
traditions or methods”).
76. See generally HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 74, at 405–06.
77. The term was added by Sweden’s delegate to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries as
a last-minute amendment to the definition during the Conference and was adopted without
discussion. HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 74, at 423–24.
78. See U.N. ESCOR, Ad Hoc Comm. on Statelessness and Related Problems, 1st Sess.,
3d mtg., UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.3 at 13 (Jan. 26, 1950) (statement of Mr. Henkin of the
United States) (“The obligations of signatory States must be accurately defined and that
could not be done unless the categories to benefit were fixed . . . .”).
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In the United States, the body that is in charge of making stan-
dards for immigration law, including refugee law, is the BIA.79 All
immigration cases first go to an Immigration Judge, and then can
be appealed to the BIA.80 The BIA is housed under EOIR of DOJ.81
Appeals from the BIA go up to the relevant circuit court that the
Immigration Judge sits in.
In 1985, the BIA used the ejusdem generis principle82 to create a
definition for membership in a PSG in Matter of Acosta:
[A] member of a group of persons all of whom share a com-
mon, immutable characteristic. . . . However, whatever the
common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one
that the members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to
their individual identities or consciences. Only when this is the
case does the mere fact of group membership become some-
thing comparable to the other four grounds of persecution
under the Act, namely, something that either is beyond the
power of an individual to change or that is so fundamental to
his identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be
changed. By construing ‘persecution on account of member-
ship in a particular social group’ in this manner, we preserve
the concept that refuge is restricted to individuals who are ei-
ther unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience
should not be required, to avoid persecution.83
This “immutable characteristic test,” or the “Acosta standard,” as
it later became known, was applauded by scholars and adopted
widely across foreign jurisdictions. Lord Hope of the United King-
dom commented that the ejusdem generis test complemented the
non-discrimination purpose of the Convention.84 Canada adopted
the immutable characteristic definition and also stated that PSG in-
cluded membership in a group when the association to that group
79. Board of Immigration Appeals, DOJ, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigra-
tion-appeals (last updated Oct. 2, 2017).
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Ejusdem generis is a rule of interpretation that when general wording follows a class of
items, that general wording is usually restricted to things of the same type as the listed items.
See ejusdem generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
83. In re Acosta, 19 I.&N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985) overruled in part on other grounds by
Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 441 (B.I.A. 1987).
84. Shah and Islam v. Home Department, (1999) 2 AC 629, 656 (U.K.H.L., Mar. 25,
1999).
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was fundamental to one’s human dignity, as well as former mem-
bership in a group.85 The circuit courts adopted it as well. This
definition continued to be used in the United States for over twenty
years, with case law sorting out what was and was not an immutable
characteristic. Eventually, based on the case law that had devel-
oped, the BIA decided to refine the definition and create a more
exacting standard.
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE PSG DEFINITION
When the BIA started revising the PSG definition, uniformity of
acceptance of the PSG definition ended. The BIA first added two
additional requirements, particularity and social visibility, to the
Acosta standard in several decisions between 2006 and 2008 (the
“2007 definition”).86 Some circuit courts accepted the definition cit-
ing Chevron deference,87 while others rejected it, creating today’s
circuit split.88
Then, in 2014, the BIA, partially in response to criticism from
certain circuits, clarified the definition and changed the social visi-
bility requirement to social perception (the “2014 definition”).89
However, this new definition did not resolve the circuit split. The
circuits that rejected the social visibility and particularity require-
ments in the 2007 definition have not adopted the new 2014
definition.90 Further, the circuits that had accepted the social visibil-
ity and particularity definition now disagree whether the 2014
definition changes the 2007 definition.91 To understand the basis
for the current circuit split, an analysis of the two BIA definitions
and the circuits’ reactions to them is required.
85. Canada v. Ward, (1993) 2 S.C.R. 689, 739 (Can.) (describing three possible catego-
ries of particular social groups: “(1) groups defined by an innate or unchangeable
characteristic; (2) groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental to
their human dignity that they should not be forced to forsake the association; and (3) groups
associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical permanence.”).
86. See infra Part II.A. To avoid confusion, this definition will be referred to as “the 2007
definition” in subsequent parts of the Note.
87. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
88. See infra Part II.B.
89. See infra Part II.C.
90. See infra Part II.D(2).
91. See infra Part II.D(3).
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A. The BIA Adds to the Particular Social Group Definition
In several of its decisions between 2006 and 2008, the BIA modi-
fied the Acosta definition of PSG and added two requirements. First,
in 2006, in Matter of C-A-, the BIA stated that a group’s social visibil-
ity is an important consideration in identifying the existence of a
PSG.92 Second, the BIA added the particularity requirement to the
PSG definition on top of the Acosta immutability test.93 The particu-
larity requirement meant that a group could not be defined “too
loosely.”94 For example, the court in Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U- held
that the terms “wealthy” and “affluent” did not meet the PSG partic-
ularity requirement because they were too “amorphous.”95
Subsequently, in Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA reaffirmed that PSG’s
require particularity and social visibility, and better defined those
requirements.96 The BIA stated that a group meets the particularity
requirement if it is sufficiently distinct so that the society in ques-
tion recognizes it as a discrete class of persons.97 A group meets the
social visibility requirement if its characteristics are “generally rec-
ognizable by others in the community.”98
In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA held that Salvadoran youths who were
recruited by gangs met neither the social visibility nor the particu-
larity requirements of a PSG.99 The male applicant in the case tried
to define his PSG as “male children who lack stable families and
meaningful adult protection, who are from middle and low income
classes, who live in the territories controlled by the MS-13 gang, and
who refuse recruitment.” The BIA held that this description was too
amorphous because “people’s ideas of what those terms mean can
vary.”100 The female applicant’s proposed PSG of family members
who refuse MS-13 was likewise deemed too amorphous to meet the
particularity requirement.101 The applicants failed the social visibil-
ity requirement because they did not demonstrate that, in the
gang’s eyes, their proposed PSG was narrower than the general El
Salvador population.102
92. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
93. Id. at 956–57; see also In re A-M-E-& J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (B.I.A. 2007).
94. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 957, 961 (rejecting the group of “noncriminal infor-
mants” as a PSG).
95. In re A-M-E-& J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 76.
96. In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008).
97. Id. at 584.
98. Id. at 586.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 585 (quoting Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 2008)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 587.
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The court in Matter of E-A-G-, a companion case published to-
gether with Matter of S-E-G-, held that a Honduran youth who
resisted gang membership did not satisfy a PSG’s social visibility re-
quirement because they did not possess an identifying
characteristic that would allow others in Honduras to recognize
them as such.103 Thus, both cases indicated that gang membership
and resistance to gang membership would not satisfy the additional
requirements of particularity and social visibility of a PSG.
B. Circuit Courts React to the BIA’s Addition of Particularity and Social
Visibility Requirements to the PSG Definition
After the BIA decided Matter of S-E-G- and E-A-G- and after asylum
claim cases dealing with the PSG definition worked their way up to
the circuit court level, a difference of treatment of the new BIA
definition of PSG emerged among the circuit courts. Most circuits
accepted the social visibility requirement. Others expressly applied
Chevron deference and accepted both new requirements in the new
definition.104 And two circuits expressly rejected the social visibility
requirement.105
1. Circuits Accepting New Definition of PSG Under
Chevron Deference
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the new BIA definition was reason-
able when it upheld the BIA’s decision that ‘‘young, Americanized,
well-off Salvadoran male deportees with criminal histories who op-
pose gangs’’ do not satisfy the requirements of a PSG.106 The court
held that the group failed all three PSG requirements: it lacked an
immutable characteristic, was “too broad and amorphous” to satisfy
the particularity requirement, and failed the social visibility require-
ment because it was not readily identifiable.107 Because the Fourth
Circuit found that the BIA’s definition of PSG was reasonable, and
103. In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 595 (B.I.A. 2008).
104. See, e.g., Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012); Rivera-Bar-
rientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 649, 653 (10th Cir. 2012); Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440,
446–47 (4th Cir. 2011); Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2009).
105. See, e.g., Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. (Valdiviezo-Galdamez II), 663 F.3d 582, 604
(3d Cir. 2011); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
106. Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 446–47 (4th Cir. 2011).
107. Id. at 447–48.
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because PSG was not defined in the statute or regulation, the court
deferred to the BIA’s definition.108
The Fifth Circuit also applied Chevron deference when it held in
Orellana-Monson v. Holder that the BIA’s addition of social visibility
and particularity to the PSG definition was valid because it was not
“vague or ambiguous.”109 Further, the Fifth Circuit stated that “the
BIA’s current particularity and social visibility test is not a radical
departure from prior interpretation, but rather a subtle shift that
evolved from the BIA’s prior decisions on similar cases and is a rea-
soned interpretation.”110 In that case, the court held that the
proposed PSG—men who refused to join the Mara 18 gang—failed
the particularity requirement because it was too broad and encom-
passed a “wide swath of society.”111 The court also held that the
proposed PSG definition failed the social visibility requirement be-
cause no one in society, including the gang, was likely to view “non-
recruits” as a group, but only to view them as individual people who
happen to go “against the gang’s interest.”112
The Tenth Circuit accepted the BIA’s 2007 definition in Rivera-
Barrientos v. Holder when it upheld a decision that “El Salvadoran
women between ages twelve and twenty-five” met the particularity
requirement but failed the social visibility requirement.113 The
court found that the particularity requirement “flows quite natu-
rally from the language of the statute,” and was therefore a
reasonable reading of the statute.114 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit
reasoned that if the social visibility requirement was not read too
narrowly, the BIA’s addition of that requirement to the PSG defini-
tion was not “inconsistent” or “illogical” with the definition set out
in Matter of Acosta, as past PSGs, such as kinship ties, can meet the
social visibility requirement.115
The Ninth Circuit also found in Ramos-Lopez v. Holder that the
BIA’s new definition was reasonable and required Chevron defer-
ence because by not defining PSG in the Immigration and
108. Id. at 446 (citing Zheng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 647, 654 (4th Cir. 2009)).
109. 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012); see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 522.
112. Id.
113. 666 F.3d 641, 650 (10th Cir. 2012).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 652; see Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that
the social visibility requirement was inconsistent with past case law that upheld PSG member-
ship where members did not have a physically recognizable trait).
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Nationality Act, Congress had implicitly authorized the BIA to re-
solve any ambiguity in the definition.116 The court agreed with the
BIA that “young Honduran men who have been recruited by MS-13,
but who refused to join” were not a PSG.117 The Ninth Circuit held
that the BIA could reasonably determine that the group was not
sufficiently particular because gangs target all young men in Hon-
duras.118 The court reasoned that the group was not socially visible
in society because only the gang would recognize who resisted its
recruitment, and that was only because it kept tabs on them.119
Lastly, the First Circuit held in Scatambuli v. Holder that the social
visibility requirement is “relevant” to the analysis of whether a
group is a PSG.120 The Scatambuli court upheld the BIA’s determina-
tion that the proposed group, “government informants,” failed the
social visibility requirement of a PSG.121 Whether the First Circuit
embraces the particularity requirement is unclear: the court did not
discuss the particularity requirement, aside from stating that it is
part of the BIA definition.122
2. Circuits Rejecting Social Visibility Requirement
The Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the social visibility re-
quirement in Gatimi v. Holder.123 It rejected the definition because it
was inconsistent with a prior Seventh Circuit case, Sepulveda v. Gon-
zales,124 and because it believed that the social visibility standard was
nonsensical.125 The Gatimi court gave three examples of groups the
BIA had previously accepted as a PSG but have no socially visible
characteristics: women at risk of female genital mutilation within
tribes, homosexuals in homophobic societies, and former members
of military police.126 The court stated that because the BIA never
116. 563 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2009).
117. Id. at 858, 860.
118. Id. at 861–62.
119. Id. at 862.
120. 558 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 55–56.
122. Id. at 60.
123. 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009).
124. Id. at 615; Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 770, 771–72 (7th Cir. 2006). In Sepulveda
the court held that a former employee could be a PSG under the Acosta standard and if the
BIA wished to depart from that standard it must give reasons for the departure. 464 F.3d at
772.
125. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615.
126. Id. at 615–16 (referencing In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (B.I.A. 1996); In
re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990); and In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988)).
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mentioned social visibility in those cases and then added the social
visibility requirement without explaining how it was consistent with
those past cases, the new definition was inconsistent with the Acosta
definition.127 In addition, the court reasoned that if a person is
seeking asylum because he or she will be persecuted based on his or
her membership in that group, “[he or she] will take pains to avoid
being socially visible.”128
Similarly, the Third Circuit held in Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney
General (Valdiviezo-Galdamez II) that the addition of the particularity
and social visibility requirements by the BIA was not entitled to
Chevron deference because that would result in the agency adjudi-
cating PSG asylum claims inconsistently or irrationally.129 The Third
Circuit noted the same BIA cases as the Seventh Circuit as examples
of cases that met the PSG definition using the Acosta standard but
would not satisfy the social visibility requirement.130 It also favorably
cited the Seventh Circuit’s Gatimi decision.131
Turning to the particularly requirement, the Third Circuit re-
fused to afford Chevron deference to the BIA, stating that it was
“hard-pressed to discern any difference between the requirement of
‘particularity’ and the discredited requirement of ‘social visibil-
ity.’”132 The court held that because the added particularity and
social visibility requirements to the PSG definition are a departure
from its PSG definition in Acosta, the BIA must give a “principled
reason” for the new definition, which the BIA has not done.133 That
case was remanded back to the BIA.134
C. The BIA Clarifies Its Particular Social Group Definition in 2014
In response to Valdiviezo-Galdamez II, the BIA clarified its defini-
tion of PSG in Matter of M-E-V-G-.135 While the BIA conceded that
there is some overlap between the social visibility and particularity
127. Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 616.
128. Id.
129. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. (Valdiviezo-Galdamez II), 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.
2011).
130. Id. (“[W]omen who are opposed to female genital mutilation [Kasinga, 21 I. & N.
Dec. at 365–66], homosexuals required to register in Cuba ([Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at
822–23], and former members of the El Salvador national police [Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. at
662].”).
131. Id. at 604–05.
132. Id. at 608.
133. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 700 (3d Cir. 2002)).
134. Id. at 608–09.
135. 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
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requirements, it did not remove either of the requirements.136 In-
stead, it reiterated that particularity is meant to delineate outer
limits to a PSG, because the immutable characteristic test is not al-
ways sufficiently precise in defining a group.137
Then the BIA renamed the “social visibility” requirement the “so-
cial distinction” requirement.138 It emphasized that social
distinction is not an “ocular” requirement and defined it as a re-
quirement that society perceives, considers, or recognizes people in
that PSG.139 It further stated that the social distinction requirement
refers to social recognition and is also derived from the statutory
language of the asylee definition.140 In contrast to the Third and
Seventh circuits,141 the BIA analyzed that the examples in Matter of
Kasinga, Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, and Matter of Fuentes could meet its
social distinction requirement because young women opposed to
female genital mutilation (FGM), homosexuals, and former mem-
bers of the national police could be perceived by their society as
members of a unified group.142
The BIA stated that efforts of members of a PSG to hide their
membership in that group would not deprive them of protected
status under the social distinction requirement, though it did not
explain how they could still be perceived by society if they were suc-
cessful in hiding from society.143 In the same case, the BIA stated
that resistance to gang membership could, given a certain factual
scenario, be a PSG, though its previous cases have generally not
awarded PSG status to those resisting gang membership or past
gang members.144 For instance, the BIA stated that a case that in-
volved gangs targeting homosexuals might satisfy the PSG
definition.145
Matter of W-G-R- was published as a companion case to Matter of
M-E-V-G-.146 Matter of W-G-R- stated that the particularity require-
ment was added because “not every immutable characteristic is
136. Id. at 240–41.
137. Id. at 239.
138. Id. at 228.
139. Id. at 240.
140. Id.
141. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. (Valdiviezo-Galdamez II), 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.
2011); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
142. M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240 (referencing In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A.
1996); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990); and In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 658 (B.I.A. 1988)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 251.
145. Id.
146. In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2014).
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sufficiently precise to define a particular social group.”147 As a com-
panion to Matter of M-E-V-G-, Matter of W-G-R- also held that the
social distinction requirement could be satisfied with any percep-
tion by society of the group and not just visual perception.148 The
social visibility requirement was partly justified by reference to Mat-
ter of C-A-, which cited the UNHCR guidelines when it adopted the
social visibility requirement.149
D. Circuits React to the BIA’s 2014 PSG Definition, Which Renamed the
Social Visibility Requirement to Social Distinction
After the BIA published Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-,
revising the PSG definition once more, circuit courts again had the
opportunity to either accept or reject the new definition. The cir-
cuits that had previously accepted the three-requirement definition
have thus far adopted the new definition.150 The two circuits that
rejected the 2007 BIA definition have not indicated their accept-
ance of the BIA’s new revised definition.151 Further, there is now
additional disagreement among the circuits that had accepted the
2007 definition on whether Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-
changed the definition and whether cases must be remanded in
light of the new decisions.152
1. Approval of the New PSG Definition
In November 2016, the Ninth Circuit reviewed an appeal of Mat-
ter of W-G-R-, the case where the applicant’s proposed PSG was
“former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have re-
nounced their membership.”153 While the court vacated the BIA’s
finding that the Immigration Judge was not clearly erroneous in
denying the applicant’s Convention Against Torture claim, it held
that the BIA’s definition of PSG with the particularity and social
distinction requirements in Matter of W-G-R was reasonable and
therefore entitled to Chevron deference.154 Nonetheless, the court
found that the proposed PSG did not meet the social distinction
147. Id. at 213.
148. Id. at 216.
149. Id. (citing In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (B.I.A. 2006)).
150. See infra Part II.D(1).
151. See infra Part II.D(2).
152. See infra part II.D(3).
153. Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1137 (9th Cir. 2016).
154. Id. at 1135, 1140–41.
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requirement because gang members who renounce their member-
ship are not distinct from current gang members or suspected gang
members.155
The Sixth Circuit accepted the BIA’s 2014 definition of PSG with
the clarified particularity requirement and renamed social distinc-
tion requirement in Reyna v Lynch.156 In that case, the Sixth Circuit
refused to remand the applicant’s claim back to the agency to de-
termine whether “Americanized Mexican deportees” would qualify
as a PSG.157 It also upheld a BIA finding that an applicant’s PSG
lacked social distinction in Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch.158 It noted that
there was no evidence that the El Salvadoran society “perceives,
considers, or recognizes” either of the applicant’s two proposed
PSGs: “El Salvadoran male youth, who were forced to actively par-
ticipate in violent gang activities for the majority of their youth and
who refused to comply with demands to show their loyalty through
increasing violence [or] active and long-term former gang mem-
bers.”159 The court’s rejection of the claim was supported by the fact
that the proposed PSG in this case was similar to the proposed PSG
that was rejected in Matter of W-G-R-: “former members of the Mara
18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their gang
membership.”160
The Fourth Circuit in Oliva v. Lynch cited the analysis in Matter of
M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-,161 and has not indicated that the new
PSG definition, with the particularity and social distinction require-
ments, is unreasonable.162 The court remanded Oliva back to the
BIA because it found that the agency did not consider all the evi-
dence the applicant provided to show that he was socially distinct.
The applicant claimed he was part of a proposed PSG of people
who left the MS-13 gang without its permission.163 The BIA only
rejected his example of employment discrimination as evidence of
social distinction, but did not consider the existing rehabilitation
programs for former gang members and statements by a commu-
nity organizer that former gang members have a visible presence in
church.164
155. Id. at 1138.
156. 631 F. App’x. 366, 370–71 (6th Cir. 2015).
157. Id. at 370.
158. 812 F.3d 491, 499 (6th Cir. 2015).
159. Id. at 498–99 (citation omitted).
160. Id. at 499 (citation omitted).
161. 807 F.3d 53, 61 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing In re M-E-V-G, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237
B.I.A.2014)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit in Gonzalez v. Attorney General upheld the
2014 definition’s particularity requirement.165 The court noted with
approval that the BIA had reasoned that the applicant’s proposed
PSG of former gang members in Gonzalez was not “defined with any
greater specificity” than the former gang members in Matter of W-G-
R-.166
2. Rejection of the New PSG Definition
The two circuits that previously rejected the old 2007 PSG defini-
tion adopted by the BIA have not indicated that they will accept the
new definition. In Gutierrez v. Lynch and R.R.D. v. Holder, the Sev-
enth Circuit continued to perform the Acosta analysis and did not
adopt the new clarified definition set out in Matter of M-E-V-G- and
Matter of W-G-R-.167 In Guiterrez, the Seventh Circuit implied it would
not reject proposed PSGs that fail the particularity requirement.168
The Third Circuit has so far declined to decide whether the new
clarified definition in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- recti-
fies the problems of the old definition that the Third Circuit held
were present in Valdiviezo-Galdamez II.169
3. Disagreement Over Whether the New PSG Definition Changes
the Previous Analysis of PSG
In addition to disagreement over whether the BIA definition is a
reasonable interpretation of PSG, there is now new disagreement
among the circuits that accepted the 2007 BIA definition: does the
clarification in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- change the
definition of PSG substantially?
Many circuits have accepted the BIA’s assertion that Matter of M-
E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R- merely clarified the previous PSG defini-
tion. The Sixth Circuit has held that the new definition has not
165. 820 F.3d 399, 404 (11th Cir. 2016).
166. Id. at 405.
167. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016); R.R.D. v. Holder, 746
F.3d 807, 810 (7th Cir. 2014).
168. Gutierrez, 834 F.3d at 805.
169. E.g., Edeki v. Att’y Gen., 658 F. App’x 643 (3d Cir. 2016) (finding it did not need to
reach the issue of whether social distinction is the same as social visibility because the appli-
cant also failed to meet the nexus requirement); Vaitkus v. Att’y Gen., 655 F. App’x 118, 123
(3d Cir. 2016) (“Regardless of whether the BIA’s standard for ‘particular social group’ gov-
erns . . . .”) (emphasis added); Sazo-Godinez v. Att’y Gen., 629 F. App’x 271, 275 (3d Cir.
2015).
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“meaningfully chang[ed] the requirements for proving a particular
social group.”170 The First Circuit has declined to remand cases be-
cause of the new definition, indicating, however, that if a case were
to be decided on the basis of ocular social visibility, it would be a
reason to remand the case back to the BIA.171 The Tenth Circuit
has also refused to remand cases based on the clarified definition of
PSG in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-.172
On the other hand, the Second Circuit remanded a case back to
the BIA in light of the newly clarified definition of PSG in Matter of
M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-.173 It held that “remand is appropriate
in this case following the agency’s clarification of its approach.”174
The Ninth Circuit also remanded a case back to the BIA after Matter
of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-.175
III. PROPOSED REFORM
The BIA’s revised definition of PSG in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Mat-
ter of W-G-R- has so far failed to garner unified approval from the
circuits, and may have actually created more confusion. Both the
2007 and 2014 definitions that the BIA adopted lacked detailed rea-
soning, stated the standard in conclusory terms, and placed too
much emphasis on a textual argument that misunderstood the pur-
pose of the term “particular social group.” However, instead of
rejecting the BIA’s definition and going back to the Acosta defini-
tion, this Note maintains that the essence of its definition can be
salvaged.
This Note proposes that the Supreme Court review the circuit
split regarding the PSG definition, reject Chevron deference
awarded to the BIA by the majority of the circuits, and require the
BIA to provide “principled reasons” for their definition. The Court
should give guidance to the BIA on the amount of reasoning it
must provide for the standards to be effective and it should review
the agency’s action after remand for consistency in its decision.
This Note further suggests that the BIA adopt the reasoning pro-
posed in the reform below.
170. Alvarez-Mejia v. Lynch, 628 F. App’x 388, 390 (6th Cir. 2015).
171. Paiz-Morales v. Lynch, 795 F.3d 238, 243–44 (1st Cir. 2015) (holding that the pro-
posed PSG “members opposed to gang membership” failed the particularity requirement).
172. Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 994 (10th Cir. 2015).
173. Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 193, 197–99 (2d Cir. 2014).
174. Id. at 197.
175. Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9th Cir. 2014).
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This Note also suggests that the BIA adopt the following reform:
keep the Acosta immutable characteristic requirement, remove the
particularity requirement, and keep the social distinction compo-
nent. Additionally, the BIA should change the social distinction
component from a requirement to a standard that can be met if
there is a possibility that society can perceive the group. This re-
formed definition aligns more closely with the purpose of the
Convention, which Congress meant to adhere to when it adopted
the refugee definition in 1980.
A. The BIA’s 2007 and 2014 Definitions of PSG Are Not Entitled to
Chevron Deference
Chevron deference should not be applied to the 2007 and 2014
BIA definitions of PSG because they are inconsistent with the BIA’s
Acosta PSG definition and the BIA has not given “principled rea-
sons” for the transformation of the Acosta definition. “Principled
reasons” should be given when an agency departs from a previous
standard,176 like the BIA did here. Otherwise, the agency acts arbi-
trarily.177 Chevron deference is given to agency regulations so long as
they are not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute.”178
The BIA’s revision of the PSG definition by adding the particu-
larity requirement and the social visibility requirement (later
renamed social distinction) was not a mere clarification of the PSG
definition set out in Acosta; it was a transformation of that defini-
tion. Further, that revision is inconsistent with the Acosta definition.
The inconsistency is most evident when viewed in light of the
groups that were awarded PSG status prior to 2007 but would fail
social visibility/social perception requirements after the creation of
the 2014 definition.179
Although the Third and Seventh Circuits evaluated these cases as
failing the social visibility requirement,180 it is likely they would also
fail the social perception requirement, despite the BIA’s conclusory
176. Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 700 (3d Cir. 2002).
177. Id.
178. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
179. See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that women
at risk of female genital mutilation are a PSG); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819,
822–23 (B.I.A. 1990) (holding that homosexuals in homophobic societies are a PSG); In re
Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988) (holding that former members of military
police are a PSG).
180. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. (Valdiviezo-Galdamez II), 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.
2011); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009).
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assertion that the groups meet the social distinction requirement.181
The BIA did not explain how a society can “perceive” a PSG other
than visibly, but merely stated that any perception, consideration,
or recognition would suffice.182 It is unlikely that the society in Mat-
ter of Kasinga would perceive,183 including in a non-ocular way,
women who are at risk of Female Genital Mutilation as a separate
group. Likewise, it is unlikely that homosexuals in Matter of Toboso-
Alfonso or former members of military police in Matter of Fuentes
would have met the social distinction requirement,184 because it is
hard to imagine how they would have been perceived by their soci-
ety in a non-ocular way when they were not perceived visually.
Since the BIA has not provided a consistent definition for PSG,
and has not given “principled reasons” for its definition, it is acting
arbitrarily.185 The BIA has failed to provide a reasonable explana-
tion for the new definition or justify the change.186
B. Reforming the Definition
The BIA should reform the PSG definition and include clear gui-
dance for Immigration Judges to follow when they are applying the
definition to a fact pattern. First, the BIA should keep the Acosta
immutable characteristic requirement because that standard was
supported by clear reasoning for its adoption and was accepted
worldwide. Second, the BIA should remove the particularity re-
quirement, because when the first part of the definition is applied
properly—the immutable characteristic—it encompasses the partic-
ularity requirement. When used in the PSG definition, immutable
does not only mean a characteristic that one cannot change or
should not be forced to change, but also a characteristic that allows
one to be categorized; having a nose is not something you can
change, but it is not something that would be an immutable charac-
teristic for purposes of a PSG.
Finally, the BIA should keep the social distinction requirement—
but change it from a rigid requirement to a more flexible standard
181. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 240 (B.I.A. 2014).
182. See id. at 234–36.
183. 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
184. In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990); In re Fuentes, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988).
185. Johnson v. Ashcroft, 286 F.3d 696, 700 (3d Cir. 2002).
186. See Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the BIA “may not
abandon an interpretation without an explanation” when it issued a decision that there was
no “extreme hardship” to a deportee without considering his community assistance though it
considered in prior cases when determining “extreme hardship”).
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that can be met if there is a possibility that society can perceive the
group. The social perception requirement should be kept because
it can offer guidance to Immigration Judges that can help them
analyze whether a fact pattern contains a PSG. It should be changed
to a more fluid standard because it is difficult to determine with
certainty if a group is perceived in a society foreign to the Immigra-
tion Judge.
1. The Acosta Immutable Characteristic Should Remain Part of
the PSG Definition
The Acosta immutable characteristic standard should remain part
of the PSG definition. Not only has it been adopted by all of the
circuit courts, but it has also been widely accepted by scholars and
courts worldwide.187 By requiring a PSG to be defined by an immu-
table characteristic that the PSG member “cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities,” courts will keep out frivolous claims while re-
maining flexible enough to accommodate new types of refugees as
the world’s understanding of protected grounds evolves.188
2. The Particularity Requirement Should Be Removed From
the PSG Definition
The particularity requirement should be removed from the PSG
definition because it does not add anything to the immutable char-
acteristic requirement. Examples of proposed PSG terms like
“wealthy” or “affluent” that failed the particularity requirement as
being too “amorphous”189 would have also failed the immutable
characteristic requirement: being wealthy is not unchangeable and
it is widely agreed that being wealthy is not so fundamental to one’s
identity that one should not be required to change it—unlike sex-
ual orientation. Further, the particularity requirement often blends
in with the social distinction requirement.190
One further reason that the particularity requirement should be
removed is that the other four grounds—race, nationality, religion,
and political opinion—do not contain such a requirement. Having
187. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
188. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
189. In re A-M-E-& J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007).
190. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. (Valdiviezo-Galdamez II), 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir.
2011).
464 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 51:2
an additional requirement for the PSG definition does not make
sense and is contrary to the reasons for adopting the immutable
characteristic requirement in Acosta. The ejusdem generis principle
requires the interpreter to find what is common among the other
terms when determining the meaning of the term, not set that term
completely apart.
3. The Social Distinction Requirement Should Be Revised to a
Standard That Requires the Fact-Finder to Determine if
a Society Could Perceive the Group as a PSG
The social distinction requirement involves a detailed fact-based
inquiry into whether a foreign society recognizes an asylum seeker’s
PSG membership.191 Such a detailed inquiry is very difficult for Im-
migration Judges to accurately perform because they often lack the
time and resources to fully investigate a case. Additionally, such
judges may not have all the evidence at their disposal. Changing the
social distinction element from a requirement to a more lenient
standard that requires the Immigration Judge to determine if there
is a possibility that the group is socially distinct,192 would counter
the inadequacy of evidence and resources available for making that
determination.
Further, such flexibility would allow the judge to account for in-
stances when different parts of the society in question perceive
membership in that PSG. After all, the meaning of society is ambig-
uous and could include meanings as diverse as the entire country, a
region, a town, a village, or an industry.
Part of the motivation for the addition of the social distinction
requirement, like the particularity requirement, seems to stem from
a desire to limit the perceived floodgates problem that could result
if only the immutable characteristic requirement is part of the PSG
definition.193 However, the floodgate problem can be better dealt
191. See, e.g., In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014).
192. For example, family members of gang members would likely meet this standard, as it
is likely that the community recognizes gang members, and therefore it is possible they are
also aware of who the gang members’ families are. See Oscar Martinez et al., Killers on a
Shoestring: Inside the Gangs of El Salvador, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/americas/el-salvador-drugs-gang-ms-
13.html?mcubz=0 (Gangs in El Salvador “extort about 70 percent of businesses.”).
193. See Maria S. Hwang, Note, Blood Relations: Analyzing Kinship Based, Gang-Related Asy-
lum Claims Under the Lens of Understanding “Particular Social Groups”, 21 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADV. 134, 134–36 (2016) (discussing the tougher immigration policies in response to the
surge in immigrants escaping gang violence, including inconsistent approaches to asylum
claimants whose status is based on their association with gangs).
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with in other parts of the refugee definition, such as the nexus re-
quirement, the criminality bar, and the overall difficulty of the
asylum process.194 In addition, the Convention was enacted to pro-
vide relief to millions of displaced people after World War II, so it
was meant to accommodate large groups—though it did not in-
clude economic migrants or people fleeing from natural disasters.
Because the Convention was originally meant to provide relief on a
large scale, the fact that the PSG definition could result in a large
group of people eligible for refugee status is not a good reason in
and of itself to arbitrarily narrow the definition.195
Moreover, the floodgates concern is overstated. The combined
percentage of asylees and refugees that the United States takes in is
miniscule in comparison to the total number of refugees in recent
years.196 The number of people being granted asylum has gone
down significantly, not up, since 2001.197
Lastly, having the social distinction requirement is problematic
because the other four grounds—race, nationality, religion, and po-
litical opinion—do not contain such a requirement, and it is
possible certain nationalities, religions, and political opinions
would fail the social perception requirement in certain societies. If
an Immigration Judge were instead required to make a judgment
on whether there is a possibility that society recognizes a certain
nationality, religion, or political opinion, most would probably pass.
This would eliminate the inconsistency of choosing a definition that
is contrary to the ejusdem generis principle responsible for the adop-
tion of the immutable characteristic standard.
194. Gabriela Corrales, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: The Real Significance Of Matter Of A-
R-C-G-, 26 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 70, 86 (2016).
195. See id. (“[A]sylum law is designed to protect massive groups of people during times
of great persecution, so size alone should never constrain good policy.”).
196. Total refugees have numbered over eight million per year since 1982, and in some
years rose to over fourteen million. Brian Foo, Distance from Home—Translating Global Refugee
Movement to Song, Vimeo (July 7, 2015, 11:17 AM), https://vimeo.com/132833445. In con-
trast, the United States has granted asylum to an average of 22,573 people per year, or 0.10%
of the worldwide refugee population. See DHS, 2014 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, supra
note 66, at 43, tbl.16 (listing the number of individuals granted asylum from 1990-2014);
UNHCR, Statistics at a Glance, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 20, 2017) (showing the worldwide refugee population to be 22.5 million). Even
combined with the average 79,329 refugees accepted, the United States accounts for the
relocation of only .45% of the worldwide refugee population. See Cumulative Summary of Refu-
gee Admissions, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep’t St. Archive (Dec.
13, 2015), https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/prm/releases/statistics/251288.htm (showing the
total number of refugees admitted to the United States from 1975 to 2014, which averages to
79,329.1 refugees admitted per year); Statistics At a Glance, supra note 196 (showing the world-
wide refugee population to be 22.5 million).
197. See DHS, 2014 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 66, at 43, tbl.16.
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C. The Proposed Reform Would Honor the Convention’s Purpose Better
than the BIA’s 2007 and 2014 Definitions
When Congress amended the refugee definition in the Refugee
Act of 1980, the main purpose of that amendment was to adopt the
Convention definition of refugee.198 Although the Protocol is not
self-executing and therefore does not have the force of law, courts
must follow the general rule set out in Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy that “an Act of Congress ought never to be construed to vio-
late the law of nations, if any other possible construction
remains.”199 Therefore, a definition that honors the Convention’s
and Protocol’s purpose and the legal obligations on the United
States of that treaty is better than a definition that is contrary to the
Protocol’s purpose. Keeping the current BIA definition would be
contrary to the purpose of the Protocol because it unnaturally nar-
rows the definition of refugee and makes the PSG element
superfluous.
Values that were central to the Protocol and Convention cen-
tered on protecting people fleeing persecution because of the five
nexus grounds: race, nationality, religion, political opinion and par-
ticular social group. Later, the Protocol and Convention “figured in
the development of the fundamental principle of non-discrimina-
tion in general international law.”200 Arbitrarily narrowing the
definition would go against these values.
D. The Proposed Reform Is a Better Option Than Simply Going Back
to the Acosta Definition
Although many have advocated for a return to the Acosta stan-
dard,201 after ten years of the BIA adhering to the narrower PSG
definition and with the majority of the circuits deferring to that
198. Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 783 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Refugee Act of 1980 . . .
sought to bring United States refugee law into conformity with the Protocol.”) (citations
omitted).
199. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also Khan
v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773, 783 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing the quotation in the refugee context).
200. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 75, at 39.
201. E.g., Kenneth Ludlum, Defining Membership in a Particular Social Group: The Search for a
Uniform Approach to Adjudicating Asylum Applications in the United States, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 115,
(2015); Jillian Blake, Essay, Getting to Group Under U.S. Asylum Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
ONLINE 167 (2015); Kathleen M. Mallon, Note, Assessing the Board of Immigration Appeals’ Social
Visibility Doctrine in the Context of Human Trafficking, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1169 (2014); Isaac
T.R. Smith, Note, Searching for Consistency in Asylum’s Protected Grounds, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1891
(2015); Nitzan Sternberg, Note, Do I Need to Pin a Target to My Back?, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
245 (2011). The Third and Seventh Circuits currently use the Acosta standard instead of the
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definition, the time has passed for returning to that standard. In-
stead, a revision of the standard that removes the particularity
requirement and makes the social distinction requirement a flexi-
ble standard would be a better solution. The Third Circuit
indicated that it would accept the BIA definition if it gave “princi-
pled reasons” for its revision of the Acosta standard202 and the
Seventh Circuit noted that the BIA did not explain sufficiently how
the definition is consistent with the Acosta standard.203 Adopting the
revised definition this Note proposes would add a reason for keep-
ing the social distinction requirement—to give additional guidance
to Immigration Judges analyzing a potential PSG—while still main-
taining consistency with the Acosta standard, thereby satisfying the
Third and Seventh Circuits.
CONCLUSION
Having the Supreme Court step in and give clear guidance to the
BIA on revising the PSG definition is appropriate because there has
not been consistency among the circuits since 2007 and because the
BIA failed to provide consistency with its revision in 2014. Requir-
ing the BIA to provide “principled reasons” for the definition and
reforming the social distinction requirement into a standard is an
excellent middle ground between simply deferring to the BIA or
continuing with the old Acosta definition. This approach allows past
cases where a PSG was found to remain consistent with the old defi-
nition and the new definition. A decision from the Supreme Court
giving clear guidance to the BIA on the revision of the PSG defini-
tion would finally end more than ten years of inconsistency and
uncertainty.
BIA definition. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 800, 805 (7th Cir. 2016); Valdiviezo-
Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. (Valdiviezo-Galdamez II), 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011).
202. Valdiviezo-Galdamez II, 663 F.3d at 608.
203. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009).
